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High Ross Dam: The International Joint Commission Takes a Hard
Look at the Environmental Consequences of Hydroelectric Power
Generation-The 1982 Supplementary Order
Since 1917, the City of Seattle has developed the hydroelectric poten-
tial of the Skagit River to meet its power needs. I Beginning high in the
mountains of Manning Provincial Park in British Columbia, 2 the Skagit
River drops 1585 feet from the international boundary to Puget Sound.
Only eighty miles from metropolitan Vancouver, British Columbia, the
upper region of the Skagit River has become a popular recreational area. 3
Its present recreational use by citizens of British Columbia conflicts with
Seattle City Light's longstanding plan to supplement its power production
by enlarging the capacity of Ross Lake, an existing reservoir that strad-
dles the international border. To accomplish this goal, the utility would
1. Seattle City Light is the municipal lighting department for the City of Seattle, Washington.
J.D. Ross, Superintendent of Seattle City Light, obtained permits from the United States Department
of Agriculture on December 22, 1917 to build two dams on the Skagit River on damsites at Diablo
Canyon and Ruby Creek. After Ross' appointment as Superintendent in 1911, he worked diligently to
transform the rapids of the Skagit River into electricity for Seattle. A third dam on the Skagit River,
at Gorge Creek, was actually the first built. With the help of President Calvin Coolidge, who pressed
a gold key at the White House sending a spark across the nation, Ross brought the first dam of the
Skagit System into production on September 17, 1924. The Diablo Canyon Dam went into service in
1936.
J.D. Ross never saw his vision completed. He died before Ruby Dam (now called Ross Dam),
highest of the three, was completed. He was buried at the foot of Goodell Mountain (now called Ross
Mountain) near the Ross Dam. A further account of J.D. Ross and Seattle City Light appears in
Barich, Our Far-Flung Correspondents: J.D. Ross' Vision, THE NEw YORKER, Jan. 4, 1982, at 57.
Municipally-owned Seattle City Light has grown to supply a 126-square-mile service area with a
1980 census population of 634,303. Its 1981-82 winter peak load was approximately 1838 me-
gawatts (moW). Energy demand for 1980 totalled 8,254,000 megawatt-hours (mWh). Report of the
Special Advisors to the International Joint Commission, April 2, 1982, at 6 [hereinafter cited as
Report of the Special Advisors] (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
2. The Skagit River flows through both Skagit River Provincial Park and Manning Provincial
Park in British Columbia. International Joint Commission, Environmental and Ecological Conse-
quences in Canada of Raising Ross Lake in the Skagit Valley to Elevation 1,725 (Figure 1) (1971). A
portion of the Skagit watershed on the United States side of the border is now included within the
boundary of North Cascades National Park.
3. See id. at 22. This report of the International Joint Commission estimated that, barring im-
provements in access or further development of recreational facilities, the Skagit Valley in Canada
would support approximately 25,000 "person-days" of use annually. It predicted that if the reservoir
(hereinafter Ross Lake) were raised without developing the potential for intensive recreational use,
the use of the valley would decrease to about 12,000 "person-days" per year. Fishing and hunting
would decrease by about 75%. If improvements in access and additional recreational development
were undertaken, the valley could support about 350,000 "person-days" of annual use in its present
state and about 342,000 "person-days" of annual use whether or not the water level is raised. Im-
proved access, however, would not increase fishing and hunting use whether or not the water level is
raised.
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raise Ross Dam 130 feet to a total height of 1725 feet above sea level. 4 If
the dam were raised, Ross Lake would flood more than 5000 acres of
popular recreational land in British Columbia and generate a maximum
241 megawatts (mW) of additional capacity and 362,000 megawatt-hours
(mWh) of additional energy. 5 Controversy has clouded these plans for
many years. 6
This Note discusses a 1982 decision by the International Joint Commis-
sion (IJC) 7 that effectively prohibits Seattle from raising the dam. 8 It sur-
veys the forty-year history leading to the decision, especially noting the
role of the IJC. The Note compares the 1982 decision and the procedures
used by the IJC in reaching its decision, particularly its examination of
4. The initial Ross Dam proposal called for construction in four stages to an ultimate elevation of
1725 feet above sea level. The first stage, to 1365 feet, was completed in 1940. The City subse-
quently raised the height of the dam to elevation 1550 feet in 1947 and to elevation 1615 feet in 1949.
See Statement in Reply of the Province of British Columbia to Statements in Response to the Request
in the Request in the Application made by the Province of British Columbia, In the Matter of the
Application of the City of Seattle for Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approxi-
mately 130 feet at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada, Feb. 6, 1981.
at 7-8 [hereinafter cited as Reply of the Province] (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
5. Report of the Special Advisors, supra note 1, at 3, 11. "Capacity" refers to the maximum
amount of electricity that can be generated at any given moment. "Energy" measured in mWh refers
to the total annual amount of electricity available on demand. The figures used here refer to the
maximum capacity and energy High Ross Dam would produce. At its present height, Ross Dam
generates a maximum 275 mW of capacity, with an average production of 66 mW. Id. at 8.
6. Since 1953, the City and the Province have differed over the plans for High Ross Dam. For a
brief discussion of this dispute up to 1970, see McDougall, The Development of International Law
with Respect to Trans-Boundary Water Resources: Co-operation for Mutual Advantage or Conti-
nentalism's Thin Edge of the Wedge?, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 261, 307-10 (1971).
Canadians were not alone in opposing City Light's plans. In addition to the dam's effect in British
Columbia, the raised dam would flood two wilderess valleys in the Ross Lake National Recreation
Area on the United States side of the border. American environmental groups, such as the North
Cascades Conservation Council, have long opposed the High Ross Dam because of its destruction of
the two valleys' virgin timber stands and recreational potential. The New York Times joined the oppo-
sition to raising Ross Dam early in 1970. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1970, at 26, col. 2. Washington
Governor Dan Evans also opposed raising the dam. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 9, 1971, at 4.
col. 1.
7. The International Joint Commission (IJC) has administrative, judicial, consultative and arbi-
tral functions, all prescribed by the Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Be-
tween the United States and Canada, Jan. II, 1909, United States-Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty]. The IJC is composed of six members, three ap-
pointed by Canada and three by the United States.
For a thorough and complete analysis of the Boundary Waters Treaty, see Graham. International
Rivers and Lakes: The Canadian-American Regime, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
AND LAKES 1-51 (R. Zacklin & L. Caflisch eds. 1981). Another excellent source, with a synopsis of
the IJC docket through 1958, is L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD. BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 1912-1958) (1958).
8. International Joint Commission, Supplementary Order, In the Matter of the Application of the
City of Seattle for Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130 feet at
the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada, Apr. 28, 1982 [hereinafter cited
as Supplementary Order] (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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environmental concerns, with the application and operation of the "hard
look" doctrine 9 as it is used in environmental cases in the American judi-
cial system. 10 It suggests that applying the priniciples of the "hard look"
doctrine is both appropriate and consistent with the IJC's obligations un-
der international law.
This Note recommends that the IJC continue to take a "hard look" at
environmental concerns in the future, though this approach is not required
by treaty. By doing so, the IJC will increase its usefulness and credibility
as a forum for resolving future environmental disputes between Canada
and the United States.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Any hydroelectric power generation proposal involving a change in the
flow of water at the Canada-United States boundary must conform to the
provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.11 Designed to prevent
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters, 12 the treaty prohibits ei-
ther country from building any obstruction affecting the natural flow of
boundary waters without approval from the International Joint Commis-
sion. 13 The treaty created the IJC as a permanent international organiza-
tion that functions both as a court and as an agency. 14 It has mandatory
jurisdiction over cases involving obstructions that affect the natural flow
of boundary waters, pursuant to Article VIII of the treaty. 15 Its jurisdic-
9. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16-23 (1977); Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511-15 (1974); Rodgers, A
Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699-727
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee].
Although "hard look" usually refers to the manner in which the courts review agency decisions,
this Note considers the aspect of the doctrine that requires the agency itself to take a "hard look" at
the problems before it. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
10. Seeinfranote30.
11. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7.
12. Id., preliminary article. The treaty defines boundary waters as:
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or
the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and Can-
ada passes, including all bays, arms and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which
in their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of
rivers flowing across the boundary.
13. Id., arts. VIII, IX, and X. Article ViII gives the IJC jurisdiction overall cases involving the
use or obstruction or diversion of boundary waters. Article IX authorizes the IJC to examine and
report on all matters of difference between the two parties whenever Canada or the United States so
requests. Its power to render a decision upon any other matters involving the rights, obligations or
interests of either or both of the parties, however, is strictly limited by article X. That article requires
both parties to impose restrictions upon the scope of the decision.
14. See supra note 7.
15. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. VIII. See generally McDougall, supra note 6, at
263 (outlining the guiding principles and jurisdictional limits of the IJC).
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tion may also extend to other border disputes upon the voluntary request
of the parties. 16
Although the IJC's duty to protect national interests is an integral part
of the treaty,1 7 this responsibility is traceable in part to a fundamental
principle of international law: the absolute sovereignty of each nation
within its own territory. 18 That principle, when applied to the water rights
of riparian states, is known as the Harmon Doctrine. ' 9 Although no lon-
ger a favored doctrine in the international law of rivers,20 the Harmon
Doctrine was included in Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty. 2'
The Columbia River Treaty, 22 negotiated during the 1950's and
1960's, rejected the Harmon Doctrine. 23 Instead, it adopted the more
16. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, arts. IX, X. See generally McDougall. supra note 6.
at 263 (discussing articles IX and X of the Boundary Waters Treaty).
17. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. II. See generally McDougall. supra note 6. at
264-68 (discussing rationale behind article II).
18. See generally L. HENKIN. How NATIONS BEHAVE 18 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing internal sover-
eignty); 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 183-86 (1965) (discussing territorial integ-
rity). The United States Supreme Court first enunciated this doctrine in The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon & Others, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
19. This doctrine takes its name from an 1895 opinion by Attorney General Judson Harmon. The
Secretary of State had inquired whether diversions by American farmers on the Upper Rio Grande
were proper when they reduced the water available to Mexican farmers on the lower river where it
formed the international boundary. Attorney General Harmon replied that Mexico was attempting to
obtain a servitude which "makes the lower country dominant and subjects the upper country to the
burden of arresting its development." The Mexican request, he concluded, was contrary to -'the
fundamental principle of international law which is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as
against all others, within its own territory." 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 281-82 (1895), cited in Johnson, The
Columbia Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 184 (1967).
20. See F.J. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-40 (1959).
21. Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty reads, in part, as follows:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State governments on
the one side and the Dominion or Provincial governments on the other as the case may be.
subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own
side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary
waters; but it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such
waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the boundary,
shall give rise to the same rights and entitle th  injured parties tothe same legal remedies as if
such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs; but this provi-
sion shall not apply to cases already existing or to cases expressly covered by special agreement
between the parties hereto.
22. Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Columbia River Basin Water Resources.
Jan. 17, 1961, United States-Canada, 2 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638 (effective Sept. 16. 1964).
Although the Columbia River Treaty does not directly affect the dispute about the Skagit. it does
provide an interesting analogy. It was negotiated about 50 years after the Boundary Waters Treaty but
preceded the present negotiations over the Skagit by 20 years.




flexible approach of equitable apportionment, 24 which provides for fair
sharing of water resources. 25 To reach its 1982 decision in the High Ross
Dam matter, the IJC appeared to reject the Harmon Doctrine in favor of
the equitable apportionment approach taken by the two nations in writing
the Columbia River Treaty.
When a proposed dam or other obstruction will raise the level of waters
on either side of the border, the IC may not approve it unless adequate
provision has been made for the compensation and protection of affected
parties. 26 The Commission must carefully scrutinize the compensation
arrangements made by the parties to assure that all threatened interests are
protected, 27 presumably including environmental interests. As a matter of
good international practice, the IJC should also explain its decision. 28
The procedural approach that the UC used to disapprove the 1967 com-
pensation agreement between Seattle City Light and British Columbia
and to reach its 1982 decision may be analogized to the approach taken by
American courts that examine independent agency decisions affecting en-
24. Id. The United States Supreme Court, discussing the equitable apportionment doctrine,
stated:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many fac-
tors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions;...
the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative not an
exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate
adjustment of interests which must be made.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
25. Johnson, supra note 23, at 235. This approach is commonly used in treaties concerning
rights of nations sharing international rivers. A 1962 work reported that no treaty between states
sharing an international river had ever released either state from a duty of compensation for injury
caused by adverse or disproportionate use. R. CHEN. THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RIVERS 240 (1962). See generally Bush, Compensation and the Utilization of International
Rivers and Lakes: The Role of Compensation in the Event of Permanent Injury to Existing Uses of
Water, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 309-29 (1981) (discussing cir-
cumstances in which states have provided compensation for permanent injury to existing water uses).
26. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. VIII, para. 7. The Treaty specifically provides:
In cases involving the elevation of the natural level of waters on either side of the line as a
result of the construction or maintenance on the other side of remedial or protective works or
dams or other obstructions in boundary waters or in waters flowing therefrom or in waters below
the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the Commission shall require, as a condition
of its approval thereof, that suitable and adequate provision, approved by it, be made for the
protection and indemnity of all interests on the other side of the line which may be injured
thereby.
27. Id. The treaty directive contemplates a broad range of interests that may be injured and does
not preclude a broad definition of injury. Since about 1970, preservation of the Skagit Valley has
been considered a major British Columbian interest. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
28. An international decision-making body "should make explicit as possible the principles of
interpretation and application which influence" its decision. M. McDOUGAL. H. LASSWELL & J.
MILLER. THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 64 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as McDOUGAL].
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vironmental interests. In many of these cases, American courts have
adopted a standard of review known as the "hard look" doctrine. 29 Typi-
cally applied in appellate review of environmental lawmaking, 30 the doc-
trine requires a court that is reviewing an agency decision to take a "hard
look" at the decision to ensure that the agency developed an evidentiary
record that reflects the factual basis for its decision. 31 The agency must
explain its reasoning in considerable detail, 32 and give "adequate consid-
eration" to the evidence and analysis submitted by the parties. 33
The "hard look" doctrine is procedural, not substantive. 34 The IJC's
standard of review under the Boundary Waters Treaty, on the other hand,
resembles a substantive standard. This standard involves assuring that
"suitable and adequate" provision is made to protect injured interests on
the other side of the border. 35 The Treaty sets forth no procedural guide-
lines for the IJC.
Nonetheless, international organizations adhere to procedures that
guarantee fairness and predictability in decision making. 36 The practice
of fact finding in international law especially helps to strengthen the par-
ties' acceptance of the decision making process and the ultimate enforcea-
bility of its outcome. 37
29. See supra note 9. Perhaps the most vivid application of the "hard look" doctrine by a re-
viewing court is the 132-page opinion in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(reviewing EPA sulfur dioxide standards for coal fired power plants). The court upheld the EPA
standards and wrote: "We reach our decision after interminable record searching (and considerable
soul searching). We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably give its
thousands of pages."Id. at 410.
30. The "hard look" doctrine is applied particularly to judicial review of decisions by environ-
mental agencies. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee, supra note 9, at 704 (discussing in
detail the rise and fall of the "hard look" doctrine up to Vermont Yankee). See Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) (the "hard
look" doctrine does not allow the reviewing court to "impose upon the agency its own notion of
which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good").
31. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), affd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckleshaus (DDT II), 439 F.2d 584, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974):
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1976), aff d in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
33. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 436-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519,549,557-58 (1978).
35. See supra note 26.
36. See McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 61-63, 258-63; T. FRANCK. THE STRUcTURE OF IMPAR-
TIALITY (1968).
37. See McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 267.
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Seattle first applied to the IJC for permission to raise the water level of
Ross Lake to 1725 feet in 1941.38 At that time the City had completed
construction of the first stage of Ross Dam to a height of 1365 feet. The
City was aware that if it carried out its plan to increase the water level to
1725 feet, approximately 6300 acres of Canadian land would be flooded.
It had therefore purchased the only two private land holdings in the Cana-
dian reservoir zone in 1929. 39 British Columbia removed the remaining
Canadian lands that would be flooded, a 5100 acre tract, from potential
development in 1930.40
The IJC held only one hearing on the City's 1941 request. 41 British
Columbian interest in the proposal was slight. 42 This may have been due
in part to the inaccessibility of the valley 43 and in part to the Canadian
preoccupation with the war effort. It probably also reflected the general
lack of concern for environmental issues in 1941.
On January 27, 1942, the IJC issued its Order approving Seattle's 1941
application to raise the water level of the reservoir.44 The Order required
the City to "adequately compensate the Province of British Columbia,
and any Canadian private interests that may be affected, for any damage
caused in British Columbia as the result of any increase in the natural
water levels" 45 as a condition of approval. This is called the "first condi-
tion clause." The Order also stated that Ross Dam could "not be raised
beyond the height at which the water impounded by it would reach British
Fact finding has been particularly useful in international problem solving in human rights matters.
It is suggested that the protection of substantive rights depends upon fair procedures. See Franck and
Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-Finding by International Agencies. 74 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 308, 345 (1980).
38. Order of Approval, In the Matter of the Application of the City of Seattle for Authority to
Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130 feet at the International Boundary
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 27, 1942, at I [hereinafter cited as Order of Approval]
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
39. Statement of the City of Seattle in Response to the Invitation of the Commission to Submit
Comments Concerning a "Request" by the Province of British Columbia to Rescind a 1942 Order of
Approval, Dec. 17, 1980, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Statement of the City] (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review).
40. Id. at 3, 4.
41. T.A. Simmons, The Damnation of a Dam: The High Ross Controversy 65 (M.A. Disserta-
tion, Simon Fraser Univ., 1974) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
42. Id. at 65-69. All three Vancouver newspapers ran the same Associated Press story the day
after the hearing. Presumably no Canadian newspapers sent reporters to cover the event. A transcript
of the hearing shows that only one provincial official attended. The Game Commissioner commented
that raising Ross Lake would be bad for fishing. Id.
43. The first access road to the Canadian Skagit Valley was constructed in 1946. Reply of the
Province, supra note 4, at 7.
44. Order of Approval, supra note 38.
45. Id. at 2-3.
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Columbia" unless and until the City of Seattle and the Province of British
Columbia reached a binding agreement providing for indemnification. 46
Ross Dam has not been raised to the 1725 elevation, despite waves of
negotiations, agreements, and repudiations since 1942. In 1947, the
Province passed the Skagit Valley Lands Act, authorizing Seattle to flood
designated lands in British Columbia upon payment of compensation
agreed upon between the City and the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. 47
A tentative agreement that would have provided British Columbia with
compensation of $255,508 was reached in 1952. That agreement was
scuttled when the Social Credit Party took over the reins of the Provincial
Government in 1953.48 The new government concluded that the agree-
ment would set a bad precedent for the forthcoming negotiations on the
Columbia River Treaty and resolved to hold the Skagit River negotiations
in abeyance until the Columbia River negotiations concluded. 49 Impa-
tient, Seattle raised the water level to 1602 feet in the summer of 1953
without any agreement. 50 That action flooded 520 acres north of the bor-
der. 51 The City continued to try to reach a compensation agreement
throughout the 1950's. 52 In 1958, the City tried to convince the IJC that it
had a right to raise the dam, using theories of contract and estoppel. It
asked the IJC to order a compensation arrangement. 53 The IJC did not
agree, splitting its vote on the request three to three along national lines. 54
A compensation agreement was finally reached in 1967,55 after the Co-
lumbia River Treaty was signed. 56 The agreement required the City to
pay $34,566.21 annually for ninety-nine years as compensation to the
province. 57 Although the parties intended the agreement to satisfy the
conditions of the Order of Approval, 58 the Province began rejecting the
46. Id. at 3. Amazingly, this clause was added to the draft order upon the request of the City. L.
BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, at 159.
47. 1947 B.C. Stat. ch. 81.
48. N. SWAINSON. CONFLICr OVER THE COLUMBIA 51 (1979).
49. Id.
50. Reply of the Province, supra note 4, at 8.
51. Id. When the Province protested this flooding, the City asked the IJC to order a compensation
arrangement. The IJC refused to do so, but the Province and the City reached a compensation agree-
ment of $5000, which they renewed annually until 1967. Id.
52. Interviews with J. Richard Arambur, attorney for North Cascades Conservation Council,
Oct. 7, 1982, and Nov. 15, 1982 (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
53. Reply of the Province, supra note 4, at 8.
54. Interviews with J. Richard Aramburn, attorney for North Cascades Conservation Council,
Oct. 7, 1982, and Nov. 15, 1982 (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
55. Agreement between British Columbia and the City of Seattle, Jan. 10, 1967 (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Agreement].
56. See supra note 22.
57. 1967 Agreement, supra note 55.
58. See supra note 38. The 1967 Agreement, supra note 55, provided, in part, that:
[lit has been agreed between the Province and the City to execute this agreement to allow flood-
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City's annual payment in 1972, asserting that it had thereby repudiated
the agreement. 59 The Province now takes the position that the opposition
to the environmental consequences of flooding the Skagit Valley is so
"overwhelming" that "no compensation could suitably or adequately
protect or indemnify all the interests affected.' '60
The City was eager to proceed with its construction to raise Ross Dam.
It contended that the 1942 Order of Approval, the 1967 Agreement, and a
Federal Power Commission decision approving the project, 61 constituted
adequate authorization. 62
British Columbia brought the matter before the IJC in 1980 with a
"Request in the Application.' '63 The Province argued that the 1942 Order
was stale and made four alternative requests of the Commission: (1) to
nullify the 1942 Order and dismiss the matter; (2) to rescind the 1942
Order and dismiss the City's Application; (3) to declare raising the water
level to be contrary to the interests of the parties because "no suitable or
adequate provision can be made for the protection and indemnity of inter-
ests which may be injured," and to issue an order limiting the water level
of the Skagit River to the natural level at the boundary; or (4) to determine
that no suitable or adequate compensation had been made pursuant to the
terms of the 1942 Order. The Request also asked the Commission to de-
clare the 1967 Agreement invalid and to direct the City to take no steps to
raise the water level at the boundary. 64 The Province later also submitted
that, by agreeing to hear its Request, the IJC would have the "rare oppor-
tunity to review, in light of today's conditions and today's priorities" a
decision nearly forty years old. 65
The City responded by arguing that the IJC had no jurisdiction to con-
sider British Columbia's request. It claimed that it had relied upon the
Order for many years. 66 The City also argued that estoppel and laches
precluded British Columbia from making its request "at this unconscion-
ing of the lands to the extent and for a period hereinafter mentioned, pursuant to the [1942]
Order of the International Joint Commission aforesaid, the "Skagit Valley Lands Act," the
"Land Act," and all otherpowers of the Province thereunto ....
59. Reply of the Province, supra note 4, at 8.
60. Id. at 19-20.
61. FPC Op. No. 808, 808-A (Aug. 2, 1978), 4 FERC 61,114 (July-Sept. 1978) (Opinion &
Order Denying Rehearing and Reopening). See also 12 FERC 61,010 (1980) (Order Granting Re-
quest for Stay of Opinions No. 808 & 808A pending judicial review).
62. Statement of the City, supra note 39, at 9-18.
63. Request in the Application, In the Matter of the Application of the City of Seattle for Author-
ity to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130 feet at the International Boundary
Between the United States and Canada, Aug. 14, 1980 (copy on file with the Washington Law Re-
view) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Request].
64. Id.at9-10.
65. Reply of the Province, supra note 4, at 15.
66. Statement of the City, supra note 39, at 1-2.
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ably late date," and that the Province's Request must fail on its merits if
the IJC did consider it.67
The Governments of Canada and the United States both stressed their
belief that the treaty provided the IJC with continuing jurisdiction. 68 Con-
trary to the position taken by the City of Seattle, the United States de-
clared that the IJC has authority "to oversee, review and, in certain ex-
traordinary cases, to modify its Orders to assure that Commission actions
conform to and satisfy the purposes of the Treaty in light of all relevant
circumstances.' '69 The Canadian Government agreed that orders of the
IJC "should not be revoked or amended lightly, even if they may be
found to be operating in a manner which may be regarded as less than
ideal." 70 It stated that "reopening an Order is a serious matter which
should only be undertaken in very unusual cases." 71
The two national governments differed as to whether the present case
fit the class of "extraordinary" 72 or "very unusual" 73 circumstances that
justify the IJC's reopening an Order or continuing its jurisdiction. The
Canadian Government took the position that the IJC should take jurisdic-
tion of the continuing dispute because attitudes toward environmental
preservation had changed dramatically since the wartime years of 1941
and 1942 and "to a lesser but still significant extent" since 1967. 74 The
United States disagreed, stating that "the issues raised by the Province
fall far short of satisfying the minimum standard" under which the IJC
may modify a forty-year-old Order. 75 It added that the treaty does not
require the affected upstream nation to agree to proposed works in bound-
ary waters or to the amount and form of protection of those interests. 76
The parties and others interested in this matter raised several other is-
sues. These included: (1) whether the IJC followed the proper procedures
in approving the 1941 application;77 (2) whether the 1967 Agreement is
67. Id. at 2.
68. Statement in Response by the Government of the United States Regarding the Request of the
Province of British Columbia in the Matter of the Skagit River, Dec. 17, 1980, at 2 (copy on file with
the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Statement by the United States]; Canadian Govern-
ment Statement in Response 5 (1980) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). Neither gov-
emnment cited specfic sections of the Treaty to support their contentions.
69. Statement by the United States, supra note 68, at 2.
70. Canadian Government Statement in Response, supra note 68, at 5.
71. Id.
72. Statement by the United States, supra note 68, at 2.
73. Canadian Government Statement in Response, supra note 68, at 5.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Statement by the United States, supra note 68, at 2.
76. Id. at 5.
77. 1980 Request, supra note 63, at 5.
The North Cascades Conservation Council argued that because only three of the JC commission-




constitutional; 78 and (3) whether raising the dam would adversely affect
salmon fishing downstream. 79
III. THE 1982 SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER
On April 28, 1982, the IC issued a Supplementary. Order responding
to British Columbia's 1980 Request. 80 The Commission determined that
under the Boundary Waters Treaty it retained continuing jurisdiction with
regard to Orders previously issued. 81 It noted, however, that its "continu-
ing jurisdiction does not necessarily carry with it the obligation to exer-
cise such jurisdiction. "82 It determined that British Columbia's Request,
and the materials accompanying it, did not warrant granting any of the
four types of relief requested. 83 Nevertheless, the IJC decided that "in
light of the views of the Governments of Canada and British Columbia
and the Commission's responsibility under the treaty to prevent disputes,
and under present circumstances' '84 the City could not flood the valley
beyond its current level. The Commission required that British Columbia
compensate the City appropriately for its inability to finish the Skagit
project.85
The UC relied upon an April, 1982 report of its Special Advisors86 to
support its conclusion that "reasonable alternatives to the raising of High
Ross Dam are available." 87 In preparing this report, the Special Advisors
reviewed vast amounts of information concerning the monetary and en-
request. M. Durning, J.R. Aramburu, & T. Brucker, Comments of the North Cascades Conservation
Council et al. to the "Request in the Application" from the Province of British Columbia 11-12
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Comments of North Cascades Conservation Council].
78. Comments of North Cascades Conservation Council, supra note 77, at 24. The Council
argued that the 1967 Agreement between Seattle and British Columbia exceeded the City's authority
under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from making
agreements with a "foreign power". See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
79. R. Busch & D. Means, Statement of Skagit River Cooperative Tribes in Response to British
Columbia's Request-in-the-Application 3 (1980).
In Swinomish Tribal Community v. FERC, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the tribes argued that
the increased water flow fluctuations from High Ross Dam may adversely impact salmon fishing. The
Federal Power Commission rejected the Tribe's contentions. The D.C. Circuit upheld the FPC and
also concluded that both the Administrative Law Judge and the FPC had taken a "hard look" at the
upstream effects of the larger reservoir on wildlife, fish, and recreation. Id. at 512. Wald, J., dissent-
ing, had "serious doubts" about the basis for the FPC determination that no new adverse effects
would result from raising Ross Dam. Id. at 521.
80. See supra note 8. The Supplementary Order is reprinted in the Appendix to this Note.





86. See Report of the Special Advisors, supra note 1.
87. Supplementary Order, supra note 8, at 1, reprinted in Appendix at 463.
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ergy costs involved in increasing the height of Ross Dam in contrast to the
monetary and energy costs of the alternatives. The report contained a pro-
jection of the average annual cost of electricity production from the pro-
posed High Ross Dam. 88 It also recommended alternative energy supplies
for the City that apparently were not considered previously by either
party. 89 Although those alternatives did not promise to supply an amount
of power equivalent to the projected output from the extension to the ex-
isting Ross Dam, they substantially narrowed the differences between the
City's demands for and the Province's offers of replacement power.
The Special Advisors recommended that the City fund modifications of
two existing hydroelectric generating facilities in British Columbia. The
modified facilities would provide 462 mW of electric capacity and
178,600 mWh of electric energy. By raising Ross Lake, Seattle would
gain a maximum 239.4 mW of capacity and 352,800 mWh of energy. 90
Additional annual costs to the City for power and energy to balance the
difference between Ross and the proposed alternative were estimated at
$3.34 million. 91
The Supplementary Order created a Special Board with the responsibil-
ity to "co-ordinate, facilitate and review on a continuing basis, activities
directed to achieving and implementing a negotiated, mutually acceptable
agreement between the City and the Province.' '92 The Order directed
Seattle to maintain the current level of the Skagit River for one year from
the date of the decision. 93 This implicitly gave the parties an April 28,
1983 deadline for agreement. While the 1982 Order appears to expire on
that deadline, the IJC explicitly retained jurisdiction to "make such fur-
ther Order or Orders ...as may be necessary in the judgment of the
Commission.' 94
Overall, through the 1982 Order, the IJC established a new set of rules
for the parties to use in continued negotiations. It set the stage for fresh
ideas by requiring the Province to compensate the City if Seattle does not
raise the dam. The Order's emphasis on preserving the Skagit Valley and
still satisfying the needs of Seattle remained the basis of negotiations. As
88. Report of the Special Advisors, supra note 1, at 4.
89. Id. at 21-32.
90. Id. at 3, 10-15. These calculations change depending on yearly water levels. The figures in
the text are for low-water years.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Supplementary Order, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in Appendix at 464. The Special Board is
composed of technical and policy experts representing the two national governments, the Province,
the City, and the IJC staff.
93. Id. at 2.




this Note goes to press, Seattle and British Columbia have reached the
mutually acceptable agreement called for by the Supplementary Order.95
IV. ANALYSIS
The UC's careful, analytic approach to its consideration of British Co-
lumbia's 1980 Request in the Application accomplished the same goals as
the- "hard look" scrutiny United States courts give to agency environ-
mental decisions. 96 The approach adopted by the IJC included an inquiry
into the adequacy of the 1967 compensation arrangement, a review of the
environmental impact of raising the dam, and a consideration of alterna-
tives to raising the dam to assure-that environmental concerns were given
a fair hearing.
The IJC functioned here, however, neither as a court nor as an agency,
but as a mediator. Although the Governments of Canada and the United
States agreed that the IJC may retain jurisdiction over its previous deci-
sions, the Commission's decision to retain jurisdiction over this matter
was not mandatory. 97 The IJC acted from political necessity, not from a
duty to maintain environmental quality. The Boundary Waters Treaty,
written in 1909, requires little attention to environmental protection. No
provision of the treaty requires the IJC to consider the environmental ef-
fects of proposed actions of either country. 98 The Commission has discre-
95. Seattle and British Columbia have reached an agreement for a term of 80 years under which
Seattle will not raise Ross Dam. Instead, Seattle will purchase from British Columbia an amount of
power equivalent to that which would be produced by raising Ross Dam. Seattle will pay an amount
equivalent to the cost of raising Ross Dam. British Columbia may generate part of that power by
raising its Seven Mile Dam by 15 feet, flooding a portion of a Washington valley owned by Seattle
City Light.
The precise wording of the agreement isbeing worked out as this Note goes to press. However, the
agreement will not take effect until Canada and the United States ratify a treaty regarding this matter.
Memorandum from Joseph P. Recchi, Superintendent, Seattle City Light, to City Light employees.
(Apr. 14, 1983) (discussing terms of the Proposed High Ross Dam Settlement) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review).
96. See supra notes 8 & 29-33 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. The IJC's decision whether to enforce its
1942 Order of Approval hinged on its willingness to retain jurisdiction. When it chose to retain juris-
diction, it became clear that it did not intend to enforce its earlier Order without further investigation.
98. Article.IV, paragraph 2 is the only provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty that refers to
environmental factors. It reads:
It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across
the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.
This provision, however, relates only to pollution and does not touch the sort of environmental conse-
quences that are involved in the Skagit River controversy. Article VIII, paragraph 3 establishes the
following order of preference for use of boundary waters:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes of navigation;
(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.
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tion under Article IX to examine and report on "other questions or mat-
ters of difference ... along the common frontier" at the request of either
party to the treaty.9 9
Both national governments stressed the importance of consistency and
predictability of IJC decisions.1 00 The IJC recognized the legitimacy of
these principles in its Supplementary Order by refusing to rescind, annul,
or amend its 1942 Order of Approval. To further these principles, the
IJC's 1982 decision had to be consistent with its Order of forty years ear-
lier. It found the flexibility necessary to reach its 1982 decision through
two devices: the first condition clause of the 1942 Order of Approval and
the application of "hard look" principles.
The 1982 Supplementary Order takes the first condition clause and
turns it on its head. The clause prohibited the City from raising the water
level at the boundary unless and until it reached an agreement with the
Province on compensation "providing for indemnifying British Columbia
and private interests in British Columbia for any injury that may be sus-
tained by reason of the City's operations on the Skagit River."'' 1 The
Supplementary Order shifts the burden of compensation from Seattle to
British Columbia. 102 Negotiations between the parties had already shifted
in that direction. 103 By requiring indemnification, the IJC impliedly rec-
ognized that the Order of Approval conferred upon Seattle a property in-
terest in raising the dam. It also recognized that the Province's property
interest as owner of the threatened lands is superior to the City's interest
in raising the dam. 104
The IJC supported this conclusion with data developed by its Special
One might ask whether recreational use, which is the primary use of the Skagit Valley, constitutes
a "domestic purpose" that takes priority over power generation. The parties appear not to have asked
this question.
99. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX.
100. Canadian Government Statement in Response, supra note 68, at 5: Statement of the United
States, supra note 68, at 9.
101. Order of Approval, supra note 38, at 3.
102. Supplementary Order, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in Appendix at 464.
103. In a series of letters and meetings between the City and the Province from 1977 to 1980, the
parties discussed several alternatives whereby the Province would sell power to the City to offset the
power lost if the City did not exercise its option to raise the water level of Ross Lake. The letters are
included in Reply of the Province, supra note 4, Appendix at 22-23. See also Report of the Special
Advisors, supra note I, at 36-48 (discussion of alternatives considered in course of negotiations,
including raising Seven Mile Dam on the Pend d'Oreille River in B.C., supply of power to Seattle
from the B.C. hydro system, and addition of a fifth generating unit at Mica Creek in the upper Co-
lumbia basin).
104. Seattle's interest in land owned by British Columbia may be compared to an easement or
servitude. However, British Columbia's interest as owner of the lands prevails. The notion that an-
other nation may have an easement or servitude in the lands of another was put forth and rejected in




Advisors, that suggested alternatives to flooding the Skagit Valley, 105 and
with its earlier study, which examined the environmental and ecological
consequences of raising the water level. 106 These two studies enabled the
IJC to take a hard look at the environmental issues raised by Canada,
British Columbia, and the other concerned parties. 07 The studies also
forced the parties to take a hard look at the alternatives before them.
The "hard look" doctrine developed in the United States as one of the
courts' responses to the increasingly complex technological questions
coming before them. 108 Most importantly, it calls for-and results in-
reasoned decision making. 109 Careful and considered analysis is particu-
larly critical in decision making in the international arena because there,
more than in municipal law, observance depends upon consensus. 110 The
"hard look" doctrine encompasses many of the same duties as those the
UC must perform, but refers to them in light of the division of responsi-
bilities between the courts and administrative agencies. Judge Leventhal,
one of the foremost exponents of the doctrine, described the role of "hard
look" as follows:
The court must give "scrutiny" to the facts to see whether the Department
acted within the reasonable range of its authority, and must go further to see
whether there was an abuse of discretion. "To make this finding the Court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment." I I'
In the Ross Dam matter, the IJC needed reasoned decision making, not
from an administrative agency, but from the two parties who had been at
odds for more than three decades. The two reports provided the parties
and the IJC with a clear view of the issues. The anticipated energy needs
105. Report of the Special Advisors, supra note 1. The alternatives are mentioned supra in text
accompanying notes 87-90 and in note 103.
106. International Joint Commission, Environmental and Ecological Consequences in Canada of
Raising Ross Lake in the Skagit Valley to Elevation 1,725 (1971). This study is discussed supra at
note 3.
107. The IJC permitted the North Cascades Conservation Council and the Skagit River Coopera-
tive Tribes to file briefs in which they detailed their opposition to raising the dam. See supra notes 61
& 78.
108. See Leventhal, supra note 9; Wald, Making Informed Decisions on the District of Columbia
Circuit, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982). See generally Bazelon, Coping With Technology
Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. Rv. 817 (1977) (discussing the full range of courts'
responses to complex technological issues).
Professor Rodgers, a basketball aficionado, claims that the "hard look" doctrine "is as important
to the judicial review of technological decisionmaking by administrators as the slam dunk is to pro-
fessional basketball." Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee, supra note 9, at 705.
109. See Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee, supra note 9, at 705.
110. See L. HENKiN. supra note 18, at25-26.
I 11. Leventhal, supra note 9, at 513 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)).
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of Seattle' 12 and the recent surge of Canadian environmentalism,1 3 have
forced the resolution of this matter. Although the IJC has a long history of
involvement in environmental pollution matters, 1 4 and extensive experi-
ence in land-use matters,1 15 the Ross Dam controversy appears to have
forced the IJC to choose for the first time between the preservation of a
rural recreational area and the development of a new power source for a
city.
The dilemma between urban and rural uses for a popular river valley is
not new. In a broad sense, the Ross Dam debate may be compared to the
controversy over the flooding of the Hetch Hetchy Valley earlier this cen-
tury. 116 Both projects stemmed from the same sort of city-building vi-
sion, 117 and both were intended to be cheap sources of public power. "18
112. Report of the Special Advisors, supra note l, at 3, 6-7. The City currently buys 291 mW of
power and projects a need for an additional 1000 mW by 2002.
Interestingly, a recent report to the City questions the energy need for raising Ross Dam and con-
cludes that Seattle's power needs can be met through the year 2010 solely through implementing
vigorous conservation measures. Alternative Resources Citizens Advisory Committee, Report to the
City of Seattle, Washington, June l, 1982 (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
113. See T. A. Simmons, supra note 41, at 86-87, 99-104, 108-09. The two Canadian environ-
mental groups most active in fighting are the Skagit Defense Fund and the Run Out Skagit Spoilers
(R.O.S.S.) Committee. The Canadian Government changed its position on the proposal as recently
as 1970. Canadian Government Statement in Response, supra note 68, at I.
That year also marked the rise of environmentalism in the United States. The first Earth Day cele-
bration occurred in April 1970. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676,
and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, were also enacted
in 1970.
114. The first reference to the provision on pollution in Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty
was made in Docket No. 4 of the IJC, filed August 2, 1912. This provision was also considered in the
Trail Smelter Investigation (IJC Dock. No. 25) (1928) where the IJC helped determine compensation
for property damage due to smelter fumes from Canada drifting across the border into Washington.
See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, at 76-79, 137-38. See generally Bilder, Con-
trolling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, 70
MICH. L. REV. 469, 489, 491 (1972) (discussing IJC treatment of United States-Canadian pollution
problems, from a 1912 request under article IX of the treaty to a 1971 proposal for a Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement that would broadly expand the IJC's authority over the Great Lakes);
Bourne, International Law and the Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 U.B.C. L. REV
115 (contrasting the International Law Association's 1966 Helsinki Rules with practices of United
States courts and actions of the IJC); Note, The International Joint Commission (United States-Can-
ada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (United States-Mexico): Potential for
Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 N.Y.U. J. ITrr L. & POL 499 (1973) (concluding
that the outcomes of environmental disputes between the United States and its northern and southern
neighbors are determined by political realities rather than the legal authority of either the International
Joint Commission or the International Boundary and Water Commission).
115. See Waite, The International Joint Commission-Its Practice and Impact on Land Use, 13
BUFFALO L. REV 93 (1963).
116. See T. A. Simmons, supra note 41, at 92-93.
The Hetch Hetchy Valley is 20 miles north of Yosemite National Park in California. In 1963.
Secretary of Interior Udall described the controversy over that valley:
[In the Hetch Hetchy Valley.] officials of the growing city of San Francisco, searching for a new
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The similarity ends there. 119 The yesteryear city-building visions of
J.D. Ross 120 today conflict with the desire of many to preserve a beauti-
ful valley in the Cascade Range whose advocates are citizens of two na-
tions and two metropolitan areas. 121 Although the IJC may have con-
ferred limited rights to generate electric power on Seattle City Light in its
1942 Order, international law is generally more concerned with reaching
acceptable solutions than with protecting legal rights.- The City of Seat-
tle's goal is not to flood a popular.recreational valley, -but to generate-firm
power supplies to meet future peak loads. The negotiations, with the goal
of consensus, have resulted in a solution satisfactory to all parties. 122
V: CONCLUSION
The dispute over Ross Dam is finally over. Resolution of this dispute
occurred because the IJC required the parties to consider all interests as
they strove to reach a lasting agreement.
Current political circumstances and the nature of the IJC as a perma-
nent international organization forced the Commission to reevaluate its
1942 Order of Approval. As an international organization with no police
power, the IJC seeks not to impose decisions that it cannot enforce but
source of water and power, found an "ideal" location for a dam site. They filed a claim on the
valley in 1901 ....
The wide waters of the reservoir would obliterate a sublime valley for all time, but the city
needed hydro power and an assured water supply and the resource-development conservationists
found themselves in a fierce contest with the conservers of the parks.
S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRIStS 133 (1963).
117. See T. A. Simmons, supra note 41, at 92-93.
118. Hetch Hetchy Dam, spearheaded by public power advocates, came under the control of a
private utility that profitably sold its power for over 40 years. W. RODGERS. CORPORATE COUNTRY 196
(1973).
119. The death-knell of the Hetch Hetchy Valley was sounded by a report of an advisory board of
Army engineers which said that, of the various sources of water available to San Francisco, a Hetch
Hetchy dam would be the cheapest to build and would generate the most electric power. S. UDALL,
supra note 116, at 133.
The Special Advisors similarly found that High Ross Dam would be cheaper to build than the other
alternatives that they considered. As this Note argues, however, the IJC's consideration of environ-
mental impacts has forced Seattle City Light to pursue more costly alternatives.
120. See Barich, supra note 1, at 57.
121. The late Justice William 0. Douglas noted the conflict between past and present values:
Hydroelectric dams were once the fad; and they went up with little regard for environmental
consequences. Seattle City Light built Ross Dam on the Skagit some forty years ago and it was
highly acclaimed. The demand now exceeds the supply and Seattle wants to raise Ross Dam.
But the State of Washington is up in arms. So is Canada where the Skagit River rises. Ross
Dam, like TVA, is a form of socialism. But whether a dam is a part of a socialist or a free
enterprise regime, the environmental impact is the same; and as people we are now insisting on
making environmental standards our important guidelines.
W. DOUGLAS. THE THRE HUNDRED YEAR WAR: A CHRONICLE OF ECOLOGICAL DISASTER 37 (1972).
122. See supra note 95.
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rather to help the parties reach an agreement that they will choose to keep.
Its purpose, according to the Boundary Waters Treaty, is to prevent dis-
putes over the use of boundary waters. 123 With that purpose in mind, the
IJC directed its Special Advisors, and the parties, to find a solution that
satisfies the energy needs of Seattle and the environmental priorities of
Canada.
Progress has been slow. 124 The very structure of the IJC, however, dic-
tated that the final decision be acceptable to all the parties, or at least that
they must feel that they have received a fair opportunity to argue their
positions. By examining the evidence presenting alternatives and making
recommendations, 125 the IJC has adopted a "hard look" approach that
best protects environmental interests. With new ground rules, indepen-
dent data, and a deadline set by the IJC,12 6 resolution of this dispute fi-
nally has been achieved. In addition, the IJC has shown its ability to solve
substantial disputes between the United States and Canada that may arise
in the future.
Paul Marshall Parker
123. Boundary Waters Treaty, Preamble, supra note 7, at 2448.
124. The application of "hard look" principles has often been criticized for creating costly de-
lay. Judge Leventhal responded to that charge:
One is left with the feeling that if judicial review of regulatory decisions is worthwhile, it is
worth the delay attendant on a careful and reasoned consideration by the reviewing court. The
fact that our system of checks and balances involves delay does not mean that it is inefficient. By
ensuring fairness and consistency, in a broad sense, with congressional priorities, the corrective
mechanism may enhance the efficiency of resource allocations on a larger scale.
Leventhal, supra note 9, at 543. By analogy, the same defense can be made for "hard look" princi-
ples at the initial decision-making level.
125. The IJC's approach is similar to that provided for in the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), which requires a reviewing agency to consider alternatives to
a proposed action. Id. § 4332(C)(iii). See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming the National Environmental Policy Act's directive in § 102 that
agencies explore all factors, consult with other agencies, and discuss and explain their conclusions),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972). See also W. RODGERS. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 725-38 (1977)
(analyzing the impact of § 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires an
agency to explore, then to show and tell).
126. Supplementary Order, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in Appendix at 464.
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The 1982 Supplementary Order is reprinted below:
WHEREAS the Commission is committed to the provision of the
Boundary Waters Treaty calling for the prevention of disputes along the
common boundary;
WHEREAS the parties have not, since the Commission's Minute of
October 9, 1981, engaged in direct negotiation on the question of an alter-
native to the High Ross Dam;
WHEREAS a negotiated solution to this matter requires an immediate
total commitment, by both parties, to the process of negotiation;
WHEREAS the Report of the Special Advisors to the Commission
dated April 2, 1982 demonstrates that reasonable alternatives to the rais-
ing of High Ross Dam are available;
WHEREAS the Commission cannot pursue further action unless the
Governments of the United States and Canada are willing to formally sup-
port and be full participants in the process of settling the matter;
WHEREAS the formal participation of Governments is imperative if
there is to be any degree of certainty that a negotiated solution will be
effected;
WHEREAS the participation of the Governments of the United States
and Canada is required in order to facilitate both the planning and com-
pletion of domestic regulatory and legislative actions and bilateral ar-
rangements that will be required to implement any negotiated settlement.
These actions might include but would not necessarily be limited to: Na-
tional Energy Board of Canada licensing; Washington State revenue bond
legislation; transmission arrangements with U.S. and Canadian utilities,
and adjustments related to the Columbia River Treaty;
WHEREAS the Commission determines that the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 confers on it continuing jurisdiction in respect of Orders
made by it, but that this continuing jurisdiction does not necessarily carry
with it the obligation to exercise such jurisdiction;
WHEREAS the Commission has reviewed the Request in the applica-
tion of the Province of British Columbia dated August 14, 1980;
WHEREAS the Commission has reviewed and considered all argu-
ments and materials filed pursuant to the British Columbia Request in the
application;
THEREFORE the Commission is of the view that the British Columbia
Request in the application and all arguments and materials presented pur-
suant to that Request do not constitute sufficient grounds to persuade it to
exercise its jurisdiction as requested therein, and accordingly declines to
grant the relief sought.
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Notwithstanding the Commission's decision above on the Province's
Request, the Commission also decides that in light of the views of the
Governments of Canada and British Columbia and the Commission's re-
sponsibility under the Treaty to prevent disputes, and under present cir-
cumstances, the Canadian Skagit Valley should not be flooded beyond its
current level provided that appropriate compensation in the form of
money, energy or any other means is made to the City for the loss of a
valuable and reliable source of electric power which would result if the
Ross Dam project is not completed.
THEREFORE the Commission, after careful consideration and in the
exercise of its continuing jurisdiction over the matter, decides to take the
following extraordinary action:
(a) Seattle is hereby ordered to maintain the level of the Skagit River at the
International Boundary at or below elevation 1602.5' for a period of one
year from the date of this Order.
(b) The Commission will appoint a Special Board of two members of the
Commission, who shall serve as Co-Chairmen, and two non-governmental
experts. The Commission will invite the Government of the United States,
the Government of Canada, the City of Seattle, and the Province of British
Columbia to each nominate a representative to be a member of the Board.
This Board will co-ordinate, facilitate and review on a continuing basis,
activities directed to achieving and implementing a negotiated, mutually ac-
ceptable agreement between the City and the Province and to provide status
reports regarding such progress to the Commission every four months.
The Commission retains jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
1942 Order of Approval, and may make such further Order or Orders
relating thereto as may be necessary in the judgment of the Commission.
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WASHINGTON'S EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION-THE APPROVAL OF THE
SEATTLE SONICS' "LADIES' NIGHT"--MacLean v. First North-
west Industries, Inc., 96 Wn. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
When Bruce MacLean, his wife, and another couple attended-a Seattle
SuperSonics basketball game on "Ladies' Night," MacLean and his
male companion requested tickets at the same discounted price paid by
the women. When the ticket attendant refused, MacLean paid full price
for the two men's tickets and half price for the women's tickets. The
game was being played at the Seattle Coliseum, a facility leased by the
City of Seattle to the Sonics' owner, First Northwest Industries of Amer-
ica, Inc. (FNI).
MacLean subsequently sued FNI, alleging that the "Ladies' Night"
pricing scheme violated both the Washington Law Against Discrimina-
tion' and the Washington equal rights amendment (ERA). 2 In MacLean
v. First Northwest Industries of America, Inc., 3 the Washington Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 plurality decision, 4 held that the "Ladies' Night" pricing
practice did not violate the Law Against Discrimination. 5 The court re-
fused to examine the ERA question. 6
This Note considers the court's disposition of both claims. It demon-
strates that the Law Against Discrimination should not have been applied
in this case. It proposes that when state action is present 7 "Ladies'
Night" promotions violate the ERA and are proper subjects for ERA re-
view. The Note suggests the. court impliedly created an exception to the
ERA that allows courts to ignore it if, in their judgment, the case is not
the "serious" type the voters anticipated would be resolved under an
ERA. It concludes that, although MacLean appears contrary to prior
broadapplications of Washington's ERA, its authority is limited because
its application of the Law Against Discrimination is incorrect and its re-
fusal to consider the ERA conflicts with the language of the amendment.
I. WASH. REV. CODECh. 49.60 (1981).
2. WASH. COST. art. 31, § 1.
3. 96 Wn. 2d 338,635 P.2d 683(1981).
4. Two justices joined Justice Rosellini's plurality opinion, two concurred in the result only,
without writing any opinion. Two justices joined Justice Utter's dissent and Justice Dolliver dissented
separately.
5. 96 Wn. 2d at 345, 635 P.2d at 686.
6. Id. at 348,635 P.2d at 688.
7. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As prospects fade for the passage of a federal equal rights amendment, 8
proponents of equal rights increasingly look to state law and state courts
for their enforcement. 9 In Washington, these rights are primarily deter-
mined by the Law Against Discrimination and the state equal rights
amendment.
A. The Law Against Discrimination
Washington's Law Against Discrimination is designed to allow per-
sons to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed civil rights free from
discrimination. 10 The first version of the law was passed in 1949 as the
"Law Against Discrimination in Employment." I" It prohibited employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color or national ori-
8. The proposed federal equal rights amendment stated:
Sec. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex.
Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). The amendment also contained provisions authorizing congressional
enforcement and stating that it would take effect two years after ratification.
This amendment was passed by the House in 1971 and the Senate on March 22, 1972, with a seven
year deadline for ratification. This deadline was extended to June 30, 1982 by H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 92 Stat., 3799 (1978), approved by the House in August, 1978 and by the Senate in
October, 1978. On June 30, 1982, 35 of the necessary 38 states had ratified the amendment and five
had rescinded their ratifications. For discussions of the extension and rescission issues see Ginsburg,
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1979); Rees,
Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX.
L. REV. 875 (1980); Vieira, The Equal Rights Amendment: Rescission, Extension and Justiciability,
1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. I (1981); Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V: A Framework
for Analysis of the Extension and Rescission Issues, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1978).
9. This is part of the more general trend of litigants using state constitutions to secure and protect
civil liberties. See generally Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980) (suggesting that, in resolving constitutional questions, a state court should
look to its own constitution before turning to the federal constitution); Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions - Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981) (examining
the current rediscovery of state constitutions as independent bases for civil liberties decisions); De-
velopments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv L. REV. 1324
(1982) (surveying the application of state constitutions to such fields as criminal procedure, expres-
sion, privacy, and economic regulation).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1981) provides:
This chapter shall be known as the "law against discrimination". It is an exercise of the
police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people
of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil
rights. The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of
its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or the
presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap are a matter of state concern, that such
discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces
the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.
11. 1949 Wash. Laws ch. 183 (codified as amended at WASH. REV CODE ch. 49.60 (1981)).
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gin," 12 and contained a section mandating liberal construction of its pro-
visions. 13
The scope of the statute has since been expanded. For example, in
1957 the Law was amended to add housing and places of public resort to
the places where discrimination is unlawful. 14 Amendments prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex,15 marital status, 16 and handicap 17 were
added to selected sections of the Law in 1973.
The statute currently contains a general statement of purpose and a dec-
laration of civil rights,' 8 as well as specific definitions of unfair prac-
tices. 19 Most sections of the statute prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex. 20 One important section, however, makes no reference to sexual dis-
crimination: the section on public accommodations. 2 1 This section prohi-
bits discrimination in admission to places of "public resort, accommoda-
tion, assemblage, or amusement, '"22 and specifically prohibits "the
requiring of any person to pay a larger sum than the uniform rate charged
other persons." 23 "Sex" is also omitted from the statute's definition of
the phrase "full enjoyment.'"24 "Full enjoyment" is a concept that is in-
12. 1949 Wash. Laws ch. 183, § I (codified as amended at WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.010
(1981)).
13. 1949 Wash. Laws ch. 183, § 12 (codified as amended at WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.020
(1981)). See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
14. 1957 Wash. Laws ch. 37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REv. CODE ch.
49.60 (1981)).
15. 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 141 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 49.60 (1981)).
16. Id.
17. 1973 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. ch. 214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1981)).
18. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010, .030 (1981).
19. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.180, .215 (1981). The statute also creates a state
agency with powers to enforce its provisions. Id. § 49.60.050.
20. See, e.g., id. § 49.60.175 (discrimination on the basis of sex prohibited in credit transac-
tions); id. § 49.60.190 (labor unions forbidden to discriminate on the basis of sex).
21. The public accommodations section provides:
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or his agent or employee to commit an act which
directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination, or the requiring of
any person to pay a larger sum than the uniform rates charged other persons, or the refusing or
withholding from any person the admission, patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwell-
ing, staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amuse-
ment, except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons,
regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical
handicap, or the use of a trained dog guide by a blind or deaf person ....
Id. § 49.60.215.
22. Id. See supra note 21 (text of statute).
23. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.215 (1981). See supra note 21 (text of statute).
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040 (1981) provides:
,"Full enjoyment of' includes the right to purchase any service, commodity, or article of
personal property offered or sold on, or by, any establishment to the public, and the admission
467
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corporated in the statute's declaration of civil rights. It guarantees the
right to purchase goods and services at public places free from acts di-
rectly or indirectly causing one to be treated as not "welcome, accepted,
desired, or solicited. "25
B. The Equal Rights Amendment
In 1972, Washington's constitution was amended to include a provi-
sion guaranteeing equality of legal rights and responsibilities regardless
of sex. 26 Of the seventeen states that have incorporated equal rights provi-
sions into their constitutions, 27 Washington has been one of the most in-
sistent on giving broad effect to its provisions. 28 This is primarily due to
the stringent standard of review set forth in Darrin v. Gould,29 where the
supreme court struck down an athletic association rule forbidding girls to
play on all-male high school football teams. Because Washington had
previously adopted a "strict scrutiny" standard for evaluating classifica-
tions based on sex before the ERA went into effect, 30 the court deter-
mined that an even more exacting test was appropriate after its passage:
of any person to accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public
resort, accommodation, assemblage. or amusement, without acts directly or indirectly causing
persons of a particular race, creed, color, or with any sensory, mental, or physical handicap or a
blind or deaf person using a trained dog guide, to be treated as not welcome, accepted. desired.
or solicited.
25. WASH REV CODE § 49.60.030 (1981) provides:
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap is recognized as and declared to be
a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or
privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement ....
26. 1972 Wash. Laws H.J.R. No. 61 (approved Nov. 7, 1972) (codified at WASH CONST art.
3 1, § 1). Washington's equal rights amendment reads as follows: "Equality of rights and responsibil-
ity under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." Id.
27. ALASKA CONST art. 1, § 3: COLO. CONST art. 2, § 29; CONN CONST art. I, § 20: HAW
CONST art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST art. I, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; MD CONST art. 46; MASS
CONST § 2, art. I: MONT CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST Part First, art. 2; N.M. CONST art. 2. § 18:
PA CONST art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST art. 1, § 3a; UTAH CONST- art. 4. § 1: VA CONST art. I. § 1I:
WASH CONST art. 31, § I; WYO. CONST art. 1, § 3.
28. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). One Comment characterized
Washington as approaching an absolute standard of review "requiring greater justification for dis-
criminatory statutes than that required by strict scrutiny." Comment. Equal Rights Provisions: The
Experience Under State Constitutions. 65 CAL L. REV- 1086, 1098 (1977).
29. 85 Wn. 2d 859. 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
30. In Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wn. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973), the Washington Supreme Court
noted the movement of the United States Supreme Court and other state courts toward heightened
review of legislative discrimination on the basis of sex. The court observed that four United States
Supreme Court Justices advocated making sex a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and that California had declared sex a suspect classifi-
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Presumably the people in adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more
than repeat what was already contained in the otherwise governing constitu-
tional provisions, federal and state, by which discrimination based on sex
was permissible under the rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests ....
Had such a limited purpose been intended, there would have been no neces-
sity to resort to the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the Equal
Rights Amendment. 31
The Darrin standard appeared absolute: "[U]nder our ERA discrimina-
tion on account of sex is forbidden." 32
Washington courts have recognized, however, that the stringent test
applied in Darrin is limited by several exceptions. The first exception,
which allows distinctions based on physical differences between the
sexes, was announced in Seattle v. Buchanan.33 In Buchanan, the court
upheld a Seattle ordinance banning public exposure of female breasts as
"lewd conduct." It held that the ERA does not prohibit sex-based classi-
fications that are based on actual physical differences between the sexes
and bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. 34
The court stated that "the obvious purpose of the ordinance [is] to protect
the public morals and its concern for the privacy of intimate functions. "35
It concluded that the ordinance was reasonably related to that purpose. 36
The second exception permits classifications based on sex if they are
intended to eliminate discrimination or to actively promote equality. This
exception arose in Marchioro v. Chaney,37 a case decided the same year
as Buchanan. In Marchioro, several Washington Democrats challenged a
statute establishing the composition of the party's state committee. 38 This
statute requires the party to choose committee chair and vice chairpersons
cation in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18-20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341
(1971). With these considerations in mind, the court held that the classification in question, denying
unemployment benefits to pregnant women, was "inherently suspect and therefore must be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny." 83 Wn. 2d at 201, 517 P.2d at 603.
31. 85 Wn. 2d at 871,540 P.2d at 889.
32. Id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
33. 90Wn. 2d584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
34. Id. at 591, 584 P.2d at 921. This result conforms to a scheme of ERA analysis set forth in
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. The authors maintain
that laws dealing with a physical characteristic unique to one sex, such as regulations of donations of
sperm, would be acceptable because they do not deny equal rights to the members of the other sex.
"Such legislation does not, without more, violate the basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment
... that the law must deal with particular attributes of individuals, not with a classification-based on
the broad and impermissible attribute of sex." Id. at 893. The Buchanan court recognized this article
as the leading article on the federal ERA. 90 Wn. 2d at 591,584 P.2d at 921.
35. 90 Wn. 2d at 590, 584 P.2d at 920.
36. Id.
37. 90 Wn. 2d 298,582 P.2d 487 (1978).
38. Id. at 300, 582 P.2d at 489.
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of opposite sexes, and to choose one male and one female representative
from each county. 39 The court concluded that "while there is certainly a
classification, there is equality of treatment and this is sufficient to meet
the requirements of the equal rights amendment. '40 More importantly, it
noted that the unique language of Washington's ERA mandated equality
of responsibility as well as of rights, and stated that this language autho-
rized the state to require equal representation of men and women to elimi-
nate existing discrimination. The court found that "equality of responsi-
bility" required each sex to conduct equally the business of the state's
major political parties. 41 It stated that the statutory classification was al-
lowable under Darrin, because Darrin did not forbid all classifications
based on sex. Rather, the court must inquire whether "in the language of
the amendment, Has equality been denied or abridged on account of
sex?" 4 2 If the answer to this question is "no," the ERA has been satis-
fied.
In addition to these two exceptions, a court may approve sex-based
classifications by finding that the classification does not result in different
treatment for men and women. This approach was taken by the court of
appeals in Singer v. Hara,43 a case predating Darrin. In Singer, the court
considered whether Washington's prohibition of same-sex marriages vio-
lated the ERA. The court adopted the state's position the there was no
difference of treatment because both male and female couples were de-
nied marriage licenses.44 The court concluded, therefore, that there was
no discrimination and that the prohibition was constitutional.4 5
When these cases are viewed together, the following observations may
be made about the ERA before MacLean. Darrin announced an ex-
tremely stringent standard of scrutiny that appeared to forbid virtually all
classifications by sex. Buchanan and Marchioro demonstrated that this
standard is flexible, within limits. Buchanan establishes that classifica-
tions based on physical differences between the sexes are acceptable;
Marchioro approves classifications intended to promote equality of the
sexes. Although Singer predates Darrin, it indicates that regardless of the
degree of scrutiny involved, some classifications are permissible because
they do not cause unequal treatment of the sexes.
39. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29.42.020, .030 (1981).
40. 90 Wn. 2d at 307, 582 P.2d at 492.
41. Id. at 307-08, 582 P.2d at 493.
42. Id. at 305, 582 P.2d at 491.
43. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
44. Id. at 260, 522 P.2d at 1195.
45. Id. The facts of Singer may indicate a type of discrimination that has been charactized as
"sex plus." This involves classifying persons on the basis of sex plus another seemingly neutral
characteristic. The United States Supreme Court has declared that this type of discrimination in em-
ployment violates the Civil Rights Act. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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I. THE MACLEAN COURT'S REASONING
MacLean's original complaint alleged only that "Ladies' Night" vio-
lated the Law Against Discrimination. Both damages and an injunction
were sought as relief. The trial court granted summary judgment against
MacLean on the ground that the practice was outside the intended scope
of the statute. 46 A motion to amend the complaint to include a claim un-
der Washington's ERA was denied. The court of appeals considered the
constitutional issue, and reversed the trial court based upon its finding
that "Ladies' Night" did indeed violate the ERA. 47
The Washington Supreme Court rejected MacLean's claims because it
determined that selling discount tickets to women did not constitute un-
lawful discrimination against men and did not harm MacLean. 48 Because
there was no discrimination, the court concluded that MacLean was not
entitled to relief under the Law Against Discrimination. Further, the court
determined that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it
refused to allow the addition of a claim under the state ERA.49
Justice Rosellini, in his plurality opinion, 50 listed several reasons for
finding that MacLean had not suffered unlawful discrimination. First, he
noted that the pricing policy did not reflect any intent to discriminate
against men, because men received discounts if they fell into other fa-
vored classes, such as senior citizens or military personnel. 51 He also rec-
ognized that "Ladies' Night" was only one of several programs designed
to attract women. He concluded that if "Ladies' Night" meets its objec-
tive of attracting more women, everyone benefits because "the greater
the attendance, the lower the rates that can be charged those who pay the
regular price." 52
Second, he stated that MacLean failed to prove any damage resulting
from the "Ladies' Night" promotion. 53 Indeed, Justice Rosellini found
the opposite to be the case. Because the money used to purchase the four
tickets was community property, MacLean benefitted from the opportu-
nity to pay a reduced price for the women's tickets.54 He stated that the
failure to prove damages precluded MacLean from prevailing in a suit
46. 96 Wn. 2d at 340, 635 P.2d at 684.
47. 24 Wash. App. 161, 171,600 P.2d 1027, 1032 (1979).
48. 96 Wn. 2d at 341,635 P.2d at 684.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 4.
51. 96 Wn. 2d at 341,635 P.2d at 684.
52. Id. at 342, 635 P.2d at 685. Among the other attractions offered to women were Seattle
Symphony performances, women's fashion shows, gifts and souvenirs, and women's hoop shooting.
53. Id.
54.' Id. at 342-43,635 P.2d at 685.
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brought under the Law Against Discrimination because the statute "con-
templates that forbidden discrimination be damaging in its effect." 55
Third, Justice Rosellini found that MacLean did not suffer any discrim-
ination because he was not denied the "full enjoyment" of the Coliseum
as defined by the statute. 56 Justice Rosellini first considered RCW §
49.60.030(1)(b), which establishes as a civil right the right to be free of
discrimination in the full enjoyment of places of public assemblage and
amusement. He recognized that the statute's definition of "full enjoy-
ment" does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. He reasoned,
however, that because the general language of RCW § 49.60.030 does
include such a prohibition, the omission in the "full enjoyment" defini-
tion was inadvertent. 57 He therefore read "sex" into the definition of
"full enjoyment." Justice Rosellini concluded that although the statute
applied, it had not been violated, because MacLean was not made to feel
"unwelcome, unaccepted, undesired, or unsolicited," as is necessary to
constitute a denial of "full enjoyment.'"58 He acknowledged that the lan-
guage of the statute is not exclusive and that certain instances of discrimi-
nation that do not make a person feel unwanted may nonetheless violate
the statute. He concluded, however, that these instances must be accom-
panied by demonstrable damage. Because the court had previously deter-
mined that MacLean suffered no monetary damage by the rejection of his
request for a discounted ticket, he suffered no compensable injury under
the statute. 59
Addressing the issue of whether MacLean should have been allowed to
amend his complaint to request relief under Washington's ERA, the court
stated that:
[CR 15] provides that leave [to amend] shall be freely given 'when justice
so requires.' Since the respondent suffered no damage but rather derived a
benefit from the sale of tickets at reduced prices, the trial court was amply
warranted in finding that justice would not be served by allowing an amend-
ment of the pleadings .... 60
The court rejected MacLean's contention that he incurred damage beyond
the mere pecuniary loss of $5.00. It reasserted that, on the contrary, he
benefitted from "Ladies' Night," and that because he was not harmed in
any way, "the trial court was amply warranted in finding that justice
would not be served by allowing an amendment of the pleadings to allege
55. Id. at 344, 635 P.2d at 686.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 343. 635 P.2d at 685.
58. Id. at 344, 635 P.2d at 686.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 345, 635 P.2d at 686.
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not different facts but a different legal theory of recovery. ",61 MacLean
alleged that he and all members of society are harmed by the perpetuation
of stereotypes about women caused by promotions such as "Ladies'
Night.' '62 The court stated that these concerns were not at issue in the
case because they did not indicate any harm to the male plaintiff. There-
fore MacLean was not entitled to amend his complaint on those
grounds.63
Justice Rosellini stated that MacLean could not challenge the constitu-
tionality of "Ladies' Night" because he had not made the necessary
showing that he was prejudiced by the practice. 64 He also stated that Mac-
Lean's complaint was "sterile" and that applying the ERA to the case
would undermine the serious purposes of the amendment. 65
Justice Utter's dissent stressed the importance of RCW § 49.60.215,
which delineates unfair practices of places of public resort, accommoda-
tion, assemblage and amusement. 66 He read "sex" into this section of the
statute, as Justice Rosellini read it into the definition of full enjoyment. 67
The unfair practices section explicitly prohibits discriminatory price dif-
ferentials.68 Considering this section, and also recognizing that "gender
discrimination can be per se injurious," 69 he concluded that granting
summary judgment was inappropriate because it deprived MacLean of an
opportunity to prove damages. 70
Justice Dolliver's dissent followed the approach of the court of appeals
and declared "Ladies' Night" a violation of the ERA.71 He found the
disparate pricing practice clearly discriminatory72 and stated that the City
of Seattle's leasing of the Coliseum to FNI was sufficient state action to
bring the practice under the ERA.73 He emphasized that the plaintiff had
requested an injunction as well as damages, and that this request had re-
ceived insufficient attention in the plurality opinion, which focused solely
on monetary damages. 74
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 345-46, 635 P.2d at 686-87.
64. Id. at 347, 635 P.2d at 687-88.
65. Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688.
66. Id. at 348-50, 635 P.2d at 688-89.
67. Id. at 349, 635 P.2d at 689.
68. See supra note 21.
69. 96 Wn. 2d at 351, 635 P.2d at 690.
70. Id. at 353, 635 P.2d at 690.
71. Id. at 355-58, 635 P.2d at 693-95.
72. Id. at 354-55,635 P.2d at 691-92.
73. Id. at 355-56, 635 P.2d at 692.
74. Id. at 354, 635 P.2d at 691.
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1II. ANALYSIS
Rules of statutory construction and legislative policy indicate that Jus-
tice Rosellini should not have read "sex" into the full enjoyment section
of the Law Against Discrimination. Moreover, Justice Rosellini's appli-
cation of the statute was unduly conservative in light of prior case law.
Rather than applying the Law Against Discrimination, Justice Rosellini
should have asked whether "Ladies' Night" pricing schemes violate the
state ERA when they involve state action. This inquiry would lead to the
conclusion that, where state action is present, "Ladies' Nights" are im-
permissible in Washington.
A. The Court's Application of the Law Against Discrimination
Neither the public accommodations section of the Law Against Dis-
crimination nor its definition of "full enjoyment" contain any mention of
sexual discrimination. 75 Therefore the MacLean court was wrong to read
"sex" into the full enjoyment section of the Law Against Discrimination.
Washington has long followed the rule of statutory construction that:
"[t]he court will not read into a statute matters which are not there nor
modify a statute by construction." 76 That is precisely what the court did
in MacLean. Its construction caused a major alteration in the content of
an otherwise unambiguous statute. Settled principles of statutory con-
struction indicate that courts should not materially alter a statute without
compelling justification. 77
There are plausible reasons why the legislature might have chosen to
omit "sex" from the definition of full enjoyment. 78 "Ladies' Nights" are
popular attractions at taverns and restaurants. Perhaps the legislature did
not wish to declare that all these promotions violate the Law Against Dis-
crimination, and, for that reason, omitted "sex" from the statute's defini-
75. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
76. King County v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn. 2d 988, 991,425 P.2d 887, 889 (1967).
77. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55.03 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973). Justice Utter's
dissent, as printed in the official Advance Sheets, called Justice Rosellini's addition of "sex" to
RCW § 49.60.030 "a flagrant effort by this court to substitute its preference in place of an absence of
legislative direction in a purely legislative area." 96 Wn. 2d at 349 (Official Advance Sheets). This
language was deleted from the final version, presumably because Justice Utter realized that it was
inconsistent with the bulk of his analysis, which focused on the public accommodations section into
which he, himself, read "sex."
78. One commentator noted that although "sex and marital status are excluded from the cover-
age of the public accommodations section," discrimination in this area might also fall under another
category, such as credit transactions, where relief would be available. This indicates the author's
perception that the omission was purposeful and would be enforced by the courts. Comment. RCW
49.60: A Discriminating Look, 13 GONz_ L. REV. 190, 221 (1977).
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tion of "full enjoyment.' '79 The court should not have imposed its judg-
ment in place of the legislature's.
Even if the court properly read "sex" into the Law Against Discrimi-
nation, its ultimate outcome was incorrect. As Justice Utter noted in dis-
sent, if "sex" is read into the full enjoyment section of the Law Against
Discrimination, it should also be read into the public accommodations
section. 80 The language of this section is broader than that of the full
enjoyment definition. It is a blanket prohibition of discriminatory pricing
policies in places of public accommodation. 81 This section appears to be
the most pertinent section of the Law Against Discrimination for resolv-
ing this case. Yet the court did not apply it, apparently because the lan-
guage of the public accommodations section was inconsistent with the
court's analysis under the full enjoyment section of the statute.82
In addition to applying the wrong section of the Law Against Discrimi-
nation, the court also disregarded precedent urging a liberal interpretation
of the statute. The court's conclusion that there was no discrimination
because MacLean was not made to feel unwelcome conflicts with a liberal
trend in case law. In cases of employment discrimination based on sex, 83
handicap, 84 and marital status, 85 the court has consistently emphasized
79. The distinction between those situations and the one under examination in MacLean is that
state action was present in MacLean. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
80. 96 Wn. 2d at 349,635 P.2d at 688.
81. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.215 (1981). See supra note 21.
82. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.030 (1981). See supra note 24 (text of statute).
83. In Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries, 94 Wn. 2d 119, 615 P.2d 1279 (1980), the
Washington Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard of proof in establishing a party's
right to back pay on account of past sex discrimination. The court noted the broad remedial nature of
RCW § 49.60.030(2), and determined that once the complainant establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination on the part of his or her employer, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to put
forth clear and convincing evidence that the complainant would have received the same treatment
irrespective of the discrimination. The court rejected the less stringent "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard because it believed it would not adequately effectuate the statute's purpose of eradi-
cating discrimination. Id. at 124-27, 615 P.2d at 1282-84.
84. In Rose v. Hanna Mining Co., 94 Wn. 2d 307, 616 P.2d 1229 (1980), the court again took
the opportunity to focus discussion of the statute on the need to construe it in-a manner consistent with
its stated purpose of eliminating discrimination. The plaintiff had been denied a job solely because he
was an epileptic, despite evidence that the condition was controlled by medication. The employer
contended that freedom from epilepsy was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for laborers
at the smelter in question. Establishment of any particular trait as a BFOQ means that it is acceptable
for an employer to discriminate on the basis of that trait, even if such discrimination would otherwise
be unlawful. The court, recognizing that improper use of BFOQs might undermine anti-discrimina-
tion laws, stated "the bona fide occupational qualifications must be narrowly drafted to describe the
very minimum required." Id. at 312, 616 P.2d at 1232.
85. In Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wn. 2d
62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978), the challenged practice was an "anti-nepotism" policy where the em-
ployer refused to hire the spouse of an employee. When two employees married, the couple had the
option of deciding who would continue working, and the other was terminated. The Commission
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the statute's remedial nature. The statute's definition of full enjoyment,
forbidding places of public accommodation to treat certain persons as
"not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited," does not present an ex-
clusive listing of discriminatory activity. As Justice Utter pointed out,
"R.C.W. 49.60.030 uses the phrase 'include, but not be limited to'-a
phrase that is inconsistent with such a reading. [The word 'include']...
is not intended to be a limitation on [the statute's] scope, but rather to
illustrate possible applications."86
B. The Court's Rejection of the ERA
Why did the court avoid deciding MacLean under the ERA? The an-
swer is suggested in a passage near the opinion's conclusion: "To decide
important constitutional questions upon a complaint as sterile as this
would be apt to erode public respect for the Equal Rights Amendment and
deter rather than promote the serious goals for which it was adopted." 87
Additionally, the court indicated that it did not believe that FNI would
intentionally discriminate against their best customers-men. 88
By considering these two factors, the "seriousness" of the complaint
and the intent of the party accused of discrimination, the court improperly
introduced subjective elements into what is properly an objective inquiry.
The ERA requires simply "equality of rights and responsibilities" re-
gardless of sex. 89 If a practice involving state action90 results in unequal
declared this policy an unfair practice in violation of RCW § 49.60.180, because discrimination on
the basis of the identity of one's spouse (i.e., discrimination not just on the basis of marriage itself.
but on the basis of whom one is married to) is prohibited under the "marital status" provision. The
court held that because of the broad powers granted the Commission, its judgment "that the legisla-
ture did not intend to restrict [the Law Against Discrimination's] coverage to cases where the em-
ployer refuses to hire any married person-or any unmarried person" was justified. Id. at 69. 586
P.2d at 1153. Once again, faced with the choice of expanding or restricting the protections of the Law
Against Discrimination, the court chose to expand them.
86. 96 Wn. 2d at 350, 635 P.2d at 689.
87. Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688.
88. Id. at 347, 635 P.2d at 687.
89. WASH. CONST art. 3 1, § I. See supra note 26.
90. Although Washington courts have always assumed that there is a state action requirement
under the state ERA, it is questionable whether this is actually the case.
The proposed federal ERA provided:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State on account of sex.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.. 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
In contrast Washington's ERA provides:
Equality of rights and responsibilities under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex.
WASH. CONST art. 31, § 1.
Because consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this Note, it will be assumed that
state action is required for an activity to fall under the ERA.
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treatment on the basis of sex, it violates this provision. The relative "seri-
ousness" of the context in which an alleged violation occurs is immate-
rial, as is the intent of the party committing the violation.
In refusing to consider the ERA question, Justice Rosellini relied upon
his earlier finding that there was no discrimination under the Law Against
Discrimination. 91 There are two problems with this reliance. First, the
finding of no discrimination was arrived at by an unduly narrow reading
of the statute. 92 Second, even if the finding was correct under the statute,
it did not dispose of the ERA question. The ERA does not require a find-
ing that a person was made to feel "unwelcome" to establish a viola-
tion.93 In Darrin,94 for example, the court did not require that the girls
feel "unwelcome" in order to bring a suit under the ERA. The mere exis-
tence of a regulation requiring different treatment of students on the basis
of sex was sufficient to raise a question under the ERA. Similarly, in
MacLean, the proper issue under the ERA was not whether MacLean was
made to feel "unwelcome," but whether he was denied equal treatment
on the basis of his sex.
In MacLean, the court actually diminished the integrity of the ERA by
suggesting that it will be applied only when the court thinks its "serious
goals" will be furthered. As Justice Dolliver stated in his dissent:
It may be that application of the Equal Rights Amendment to the "pro-
motional" activity of the defendant is not the sort of thing the voters had in
mind when they adopted HJR 61. Then again, an equally persuasive argu-
ment could be made that ticket price differentials based on sex were indeed
one of a number of activities which they hoped to end. It is idle to specu-
late. 95
In effect, the plurality opinion in MacLean creates a new, subjective
exception to the ERA. Unlike the well-defined limitations set out in Bu-
chanan,96 Marchioro,97 and Singer,98 this exception is nebulous and sus-
ceptible of widely varying applications. Arguably, this type of case
erodes public confidence in the judiciary, because it gives the appearance
of selective enforcement of the law according to the priorities of the indi-
viduals on the bench. If the public did not intend the ERA to apply to
91. 96 Wn. 2d at 347, 635 P.2d at 688.
92. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
93. WASH. CONsT. art. 3 1, § 1. See supra note 26.
94. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
95. 96 Wn. 2d at 358, 635 P.2d 693.
96. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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"Ladies' Night" pricing schemes, the public should modify the ERA ac-
cordingly. It is inappropriate for the court to make this decision.
At first glance, the MacLean decision appears to signal conservative
applications of the ERA in the future. A closer reading, however, sug-
gests that the precedental value of the case is limited in several ways.
First, as discussed earlier, the analysis in the case ignores the clear lan-
guage of the amendment by incorporating the Law Against Discrimina-
tion's definition of discrimination. Future cases involving only the ERA
will limit the court to the amendment's language requiring "equality of
rights and responsibilities" under the law. Second, MacLean may be ex-
plained in part as a decision by the court to defer to the trial court in a
matter of procedure. The trial court refused to allow an amendment to the
original complaint adding a claim under the ERA. 99 While the complaint
could have properly been amended had "justice so required," the trial
court has wide discretion in such matters. 100
C. Proposed Resolution Under the ERA
Because the Law Against Discrimination was inapplicable, MacLean
should have been decided under the ERA. The court should have first
considered whether FNI was involved in "state action" sufficient to sub-
ject it to examination under the ERA.101 If state action was found, the
court should then have determined whether "Ladies' Night" pricing
schemes violate the standard of review established in previous Washing-
ton cases.
The state action question depends upon the lease arrangement between
the City of Seattle and FNI. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 102 the United States Supreme Court stated that a private party's dis-
criminatory conduct violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it occurred on property leased by a government body
to the private party. 103 The situation in MacLean was not only similar to
that in Burton, but the City of Seattle's connection to the discriminatory
activity was even stronger. In Burton, the Parking Authority derived only
an indirect benefit from the discriminatory practices of its tenant. 104 In
MacLean, on the other hand, FNI hired city employees to
99. 96 Wn. 2d at 345, 635 P.2d at 686.
100. See In re Schnoor's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 565, 572, 198 P.2d 184, 189 (1948) ("A pleading,
once amended, cannot be further amended without leave of court, and the granting or denying thereof
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.").
101. See supra note 90.
102. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
103. ld. at 725-26.
104. Id. at 720. The parking authority received annual rent payments under a twenty year lease.
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staff the facility, and the city derived a direct financial benefit from the
sale of refreshments and merchandise to persons admitted under the dis-
criminatory pricing scheme.105 Under Burton and the resulting line of
cases, the lease between the city and FNI constituted state action.
Once state action is established, the question becomes whether "La-
dies' Nights" violate Washington's ERA. An examination of Darrin and
its progeny reveals that this type of practice is unacceptable under the
ERA.
In Darrin, the court stated that "under our ERA discrimination on ac-
count of sex is forbidden."1 06 This stringent standard clearly prohibits
charging men and women different prices. The exceptions created in Bu-
chanan and Marchioro do not affect this conclusion. In Buchanan, the
court allowed the distinction because it related to physical differences be-
tween the sexes. 107 "Ladies' Night" is not based upon any physical dif-
ferences, but only on notions of women's and men's differing interests in
basketball. This is precisely the type of rationale that was rejected in Dar-
rin as impermissible. In Marchioro, the court allowed a distinction based
on sex only because its purpose was to further equality of the sexes. 108 No
such motive was present in MacLean. Indeed, FNI admitted that it
charged women lower prices solely to boost its ticket sales. 109 In Singer,
the classification based on sex was upheld when it did not result in differ-
ent treatment for men and women."10 When a female pays $2.50 for a
ticket and a male pays $5.00, it cannot be said that they are not treated
differently.
IV. CONCLUSION
In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of America, Inc., the Wash-
ington Supreme Court determined that "Ladies' Night" pricing promo-
tions do not violate the state Law Against Discrimination. Based on this
finding, the court did not consider whether they violate the state ERA.
The decision not to review the case under the ERA was apparently related
to the court's perception that it was frivolous. This is unfortunate because
it suggests that the ERA may be selectively applied according to the pre-
dispositions of individual judges. It effectively creates a new, subjective
exception to the ERA. The case may be limited to its facts, however,
105. 96 Wn. 2d at 356, 635 P.2d at 692.
106. 85 Wn. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
107. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
109. 96 Wn. 2d at 341, 635 P.2d at 684.
110. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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because it incorrectly applies the Law Against Discrimination and it con-
flicts with the clear language of the amendment. Future cases arising un-
der the ERA should look for guidance not to MacLean, but to the words
of the amendment itself, which requires "equality of rights" under the
law. I I
Mary Patrice McCausland
I 11. WASH- CONST art. 31, § 1.
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